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Abstrak 
Artikel ini membahas kasus kelaparan bersejarah di Kazakhstan tahun 1931-1933 untuk menggambarkan bahwa 
‘kelaparan’ atau ‘krisis pangan’ terjadi utamanya karena ‘pengabaian berpengetahuan’ oleh sistem pemerintahan Soviet 
dalam upayanya mengejar prioritas perkembangan modern. Tulisan ini mengeksplorasi konsep ‘kelaparan’ melalui 
Malthusianisme, ‘pendekatan hak,’ dan konsep ‘kelaparan baru.’ Kasus ini menunjukkan bahwa kebijakan politik 
pemerintah Soviet memperburuk kondisi masyarakat pinggiran dan terpinggirkan untuk mencapai prioritas ‘kebaikan 
yang lebih besar’ dari kepentingan nasionalnya, terutama industrialisasi dan pembangunan ekonomi modern. Kasus ini 
menunjukkan bahwa setiap promosi atas ‘identitas’ dominan, khususnya dalam bentuk pembangunan modern dianggap 
lebih ‘beradab’ sehingga secara tidak langsung memiliki kecenderungan terhadap pengucilan dan penindasan kehidupan 
tradisional masyarakat pinggiran. Secara keseluruhan, artikel ini secara kritis mengeksplorasi ‘kelaparan’ sebagai 
masalah biopolitik kompleks dari tindakan publik maupun ketidakadaan tindakan, kegagalan akuntabilitas yang 
memunculkan ‘pengabaian yang berpengetahuan.’ 
Kata kunci: kelaparan, ketahanan pangan, biopolitik, konstruksi tentang dunia ketiga, modernisasi, industrialisasi Soviet. 
 
Abstract 
This article examines and problematizes the historical case of famine in Kazakhstan between 1931-1933 to illustrate 
that ‘starvation,’ ‘famine,’ or ‘food crisis’ occurred primarily because of ‘knowledgeable neglect’ by the Soviet 
governance to pursue the priorities of modern development. This paper explores the concepts of ‘famine’ through 
Malthusianism, ‘entitlement approach,’ and ‘new famine.’ The case shows that particular Soviet government 
policies and political decisions by individual officials worsened the condition of marginalized communities on behalf 
of the attainment of a ‘greater good’ of the national government priorities. The case demonstrates that any 
promotion of a dominant ‘identity’ exposes the inclination towards exclusion and repression of ‘bare life’ of 
peripheral people. Overall, the article critically explores the ‘famine’ as a complex biopolitical problem of public 
action or inaction, failure of accountability, and therefore generating ‘knowledgeable neglect’ of periphery 
populations.  
Keywords: famine, food security, biopolitics, third worldism, modernization, Soviet industrialization. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Kazakhs lived at the socio-political frontier of the Russian Empire and maintained a nomadic 
existence according to four seasons of the harsh Eurasian continental steppe climate. The traditional 
Kazakhs moved at least four times in a year to ‘auls’ (villages) rotating to different areas—Kokteu, 
Zhailau, Kuzdeu, and Kystau—i.e., spring, summer, autumn, and winter pastures. This traditional 
nomadic practice existed for hundreds, if not thousands, of years in the steppes of Eurasia, whose 
environmentally sustainable husbandry and pastoralism protected the existence of several generations of 
Kazakh tribes without major ethnocide-level food crises. Kazakhs are of Turkic descent speaking Kazakh 
language and practising a historic mix of traditional Sufi Islam and more institutionalized mosque-
centred Sunni Islam of the Hanafi madhhab. Because of their nomadic lifestyle in the climatically harsh 
steppes of Northern Eurasia, they were unable to settle into a more institutionalized Islamic traditions 
of their southern neighbours such as Uzbeks and Tajiks, who since 7th century AD were Islamized by 
Arabs invading the Ferghana Valley (Mawarannahr) from Mesopotamia. Proto-Kazakhs had superficial 
exposure to Islam and persisted with their traditional beliefs and invocations which combined elements 
of Tengrism, Shamanism, Zoroastrianism, and Buddhism, who combined their Islamic belief with the 
nomadic proto-Turko-Mongol or Hun traditions of the “harmonious unity between humans and the 
surrounding world, the blue skies, and endless steppe, and in particular, the helping power of ancestral 
spirits and the cult of saints and batyrs” (Yemelianova, 2014: 287-289). The migration of settled Muslim 
Tatars from the city of Kazan in Russia to the Kazakh steppes started in the 18th century under the 
policy of the Catherine the Great (1762-1796) for “legalisation and management of her Muslim 
subjects.” Russian Imperial biopolitical governmentality disciplined Kazakhs into ‘civilized’ life with the 
“persistent erosion of Kazakh nomadism through the official policy of Kazakh settlement;” however, the 
lifeworld of Kazakhs with nomadic Sufi rituals and traditions of the steppe ended with the Bolshevik 
Revolution and the establishment of the Soviet Union (Yemelianova, 2014: 286-289). 
Kazakhs in 1920-1930s were still culturally quite distinct from the majority Russian ethnics in the 
west and north and the settled Uzbeks and Tajiks in the south. In the late 1920s, only 23 percent of 
Kazakhs were entirely sedentary (Pianciola, 2001). As a result of the 1930s collectivization policies for 
development of Soviet modern agriculture “approximately 38 percent of the total population” deaths in 
Kazakhstan were “directly attributable to the famine of 1931-1933” (Pianciola, 2001: 237). The 
magnitude of human suffering becomes even more disturbing as Northern and Eastern Kazakhstan 
were included into grand Soviet industrialization plans for agricultural expansion and modernization of 
grain cultivation (Pianciola, 2001). The suffering and death of traditionally nomadic and Muslim 
Kazakhs seemed to be necessary for the successful modernization, social transformation, and industrial 
progress of Soviet Union. 
Historic changes in the understanding of famine had shaped current perceptions regarding 
international aid, humanitarianism, and government policies. Famine can be viewed as a consequence 
of natural disaster, a lack of food production, a disruption of food supply and distribution, a man-made 
economic, political, or even military instrument. In contrast, the term ‘famine’ as examined in this 
article refers not only to a passive state suffered by unfortunate mass of persons, but also to a condition 
created by an authoritative few either through direct intervention or through neglection. Thus, famine 
as discussed in this paper will be broader in scope than the specific World Health Organization (WHO) 
and the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) terms of ‘chronic undernutrition’ or ‘hidden 
hunger.’ FAO and WHO recommend the average energy intake for adults of 2,250 calories a day to 
sustain light activity. If a person continuously receives less than that amount of calories (depending on 
climate and physical activity) than he/she would go under the category of ‘chronic undernutrition.’ If a 
person does not receive the recommended daily amount of micronutrients (vitamins and minerals) with 
the diet, than he/she would be categorized under the ‘hidden hunger’ (Paarlberg, 2010). This paper will 
show that the widely-held belief in the beneficence of institutional governance may not be sustainable, 
even if authorities of globally-capable organizations accept the validity of Grotian liberal definitions of 
‘rights’ (Stumpf, 2006) and ‘justice’ (Guidance Note of the Secretary General, 2010). Cases of food 
crises created and worsened by state lapses continue to occur in contemporary society. These may also 
be linked to the practice of governments to prioritize their systems over the well-being and survival of 
particular, often marginalized peoples that the systems should serve. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Information from historical materials of the recently-defunct Eastern Bloc points to several issues on 
institutionally-induced suffering. First, it allows the problem to be located in a context where systems of 
governance and management other than those of the United States were considered troublesome, 
inferior, and undesirable particularly by American analysts (Robertson, 1980). Second, the approach 
allows a thematic exit from the fallacy of composition that discourse on ‘identity’ seems to imply 
(Malesevic, 2006); that is, a ‘Soviet’ identity may not necessarily correspond to a totalizing summary of 
the negative effects that Soviet governance may have had on its citizens. Third, and crucially, the belief 
that the passing of the Soviet Union allows the populations of the world to identify with the 
triumphant, peaceful, and prosperous ‘new world order’ of neoliberalism and free markets (Freedman, 
1992) does not settle the issue that dominant ‘identity,’ particularly in its modernist form that include 
‘civilizing’ function, reinforces tendencies towards exclusion and repression (Parfitt, 2002). 
This is most clearly seen in the rehabilitation of the term ‘Third Worldism’ to refer to a form of 
resistance to an American led ‘imperialism’ (Patel & McMichael, 2004) and to a reference to a ‘third 
world poor’ as ‘homines sacri’ whose economic upliftment is the moral justification of the ‘democratico-
capitalist project’ that has caused a global imbalance of wealth (Parfitt, 2009). In fact, the term ‘Third 
World’ was used originally to refer to a form of social existence that was in transition, rather than in 
opposition to the capitalist and communist blocs, in the middle of the Cold War (Sauve, 1986). Thus, it 
is possible to study the problems associated with famine and knowledgeable neglect in order to identify 
lessons for the present, without the need to create solidarity with the past or to limit the analysis to the 
perspectives of either the author or the reader. More positively, broadening the ways in which famine 
can be understood will only bring benefits to those who seek to resolve it regardless of ideological 
‘identity’ (Malesevic, 2006) or institutional system it may represent. 
In its simplest form, famine is a disaster that occurs when a “large numbers of people die quickly 
because they have not had enough food to eat.” In these circumstances some people “die from actual 
starvation—acute wasting—and others die from diseases that attack them in their wasted state” (Parfitt, 
2002: 46).  The concept of famine has been explained and re-defined through history. The famous 
examples of famine are the great famine in Europe in 1315-1317, “a combination of warfare, crop 
failures and epidemics reduced the population by two-thirds” in France during Hundred Years War, 
and the crop failure due to potato disease in 1845-1849 in Ireland had killed about one million people 
(Parfitt, 2002: 46-47).  The more recent examples in 20th century are the “Bengali famine of 1943, the 
Leningrad famine of 1941–44, the Chinese Great Leap Forward famine of 1959–61” (Parfitt, 2002: 47). 
Devereux argues that there is a chronological ‘intellectual progression’ about the way we think about a 
famine. He divided the debate into two major categories and called them ‘old famine’ and ‘new famine.’ 
This progression included two major shifts: (1) “from famines as failures of food availability, to failures 
of access to food” and (2) more recent shift of the discourse toward the “failures of accountability and 
response” (Devereux, 2007: 9). Malthusian (Malthus, 1798) approaches classified famines as ‘acts of 
God’ occurred as natural disasters, resource scarcities, and population growth. However, the 
contemporary notion of famine and its causes are leaning towards the “‘acts of man’ (they are caused by 
human action or inaction)” (Devereux, 2007: 11). Even economic aspects of Amartya Sen’s ‘entitlement 
approach’ (Sen, 1981) to hardship identify factors such as poverty and market failure as essential to 
understanding the causes of some famine cases. In contemporary times, famines could still be 
foreseeable and avoidable unless there is a failure of ‘public transfers.’ The ‘new famine’ notion is 
considered “political because they are almost always preventable” (Devereux, 2007: 11). 
Thus, the primary question of this paper is, how has the definition and understanding of ‘famine’ 
changed?  And the secondary question is, what was the impact of this understanding on food politics 
and historical revisionism of 1930s famine in Kazakhstan? This paper approaches famine as a complex 
biopolitical concept. The understanding and definition of ‘famine’ has changed from (1) the notion of 
‘lack of food’ caused by the growing population and limited natural resources, to which the policy-
making system and market can only react, to (2) the notion of the political tool for the management of 
populations through threats and deliberately-induced mass hunger. Correspondingly, the concept of 
food has also shifted from (1) the idea of a commodity to be maximized in production and to be given 
full distribution by state and private sector mechanisms to (2) the idea of a resource which may be 
manipulated by persons in authority to satisfy other political agendas, which may or may not be directly 
related to nutritional well-being of the population. 
The first part of the paper will provide the literature review and critical reflections of ‘old famine’ 
and ‘new famine’ using biopolitical perspective; and the second part of the paper will examine the case 
of the Soviet famine in Kazakhstan. This paper will use the illustrative case analysis in order to 
understand and explain the famine from different conceptual perspectives. The case analysis will 
include the literature review and the archival research of historic documents during the period of 1920s 
and 1930s to assist in the attempt of social constructivism of the famine concept. 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
THEORIES OF ‘OLD FAMINE’ AND ‘NEW FAMINE’ 
Among the theories explaining the ‘old famine’ concept, the most prominent are Malthusianism and 
the ‘entitlement approach’ (Devereux, 2007). Malthusianism describes famine as a consequence of two 
simultaneous events: (1) natural resource usage and food production growth in arithmetic progression 
and (2) population growth in geometric progression. The result is lack of food for large populations. 
This explanation has been recently revisited by environmental determinism and neo-Malthusianism 
 (Willis, 2005) that emphases the natural resource shortage, environmental degradation, limits for 
industrial growth, and unsustainable development. In contrast, the ‘entitlement approach’ have 
directed the discussions towards the economic issues of underdevelopment, poverty, market failures, 
and food production (Sen, 1981). Thus, in spite of Devereux’s ‘old famine’ tag, both theories can be 
useful to discuss the contemporary ecological, demographic, and economic characteristics of famine. 
Malthusianism and Entitlement Approach 
One of the oldest and most famous explanations of famine was written by the English priest Thomas 
Malthus in the Essay on the Principle of Population published in 1798. Thomas Malthus argued that 
famine will occur “to regulate population growth and balance the demand for food with food supplies 
human populations” (Devereux, 2007: 5-6). In other words, the population cannot grow indefinitely 
and have a comfortable life due to the limited natural resources on the Earth. Thus, Thomas Malthus 
explained food scarcity using the two propositions about population and natural resources: first, that 
food is necessary for human existence and, second, population growth may exceed the resources 
necessary to support human populations (Malthus, 1798). For “every generation, food supply increases 
the same amount” that leads to the linear pattern of arithmetic growth. However, the population will 
grow in geometric progression “because in each generation there will be more people to have children” 
(Willis, 2005: 146-147). This ‘mainstreamed’ concept of famine (Devereux, 2007: 2) has influenced the 
technical/technological solutions to food crisis, such as the Green Revolution in the Philippines, 
Mexico, and India, the Virgin Land Campaign in the Soviet Union, and the UN projects on population 
control in the Global South. Moreover, this concept of famine and its political acceptance by the 
mainstream public policy has improved the funding and prevalence of highly politicized 
biotechnological and genetic engineering approaches to solutions for food crisis.   
Malthus has been criticized particularly for his assumption about the growth of food production. 
The context of 18th century England shows that he wrote his essay during the early stages of industrial 
revolution. Malthusianism was dependent on the conditions in pre-industrial agricultural England, 
which were “defined by the harvests and the seasons, and ruled by small political and social elite” (BBC 
History On-line, 2013). During the 19th century, the life in Britain dramatically changed due to 
technological inventions. For example, the invention of steam engine “farm workers made redundant” 
and caused them to migrate to towns and cities for work in the factories and fast-growing manufacturing 
(Robinson, 2011). Overall, the industrial revolution brought a massive productivity growth, which 
included agricultural production. Consequently in the next two hundred years there would be new 
technologies, agricultural methods, legislation, and public policies that had been developed for food 
production to prevent and mitigate the food crises.  Nevertheless, “just because sufficient food is 
produced to feed a population does not mean that everyone has access to this food” (Willis, 2005: 147 -
148). 
In 1981, poverty and famines introduced the notion of ‘entitlement to food’. Sen proved through 
his research of 1974 famine in Bangladesh that famine can occur without food shortage or harvest 
failures. Even though the harvest might be officially satisfactory on the national and regional level, some 
individuals and households might not be able to source the food. Famine might happen because of the 
‘exchange entitlement decline’ among vulnerable groups in the society (Sen, 1981). The cases of famine 
in Bangladesh in 1974 and Great Bengal Famine in 1943 showed that “inflation caused by expectations 
of harvest failure made food unaffordable for market-dependent landless labourers, because wealthy 
people and traders hoarded rice in anticipation of a shortage.” This speculation and inflation-induced 
famine resulted in 1.5 million deaths in spite of the availability of food on the national level (Devereux, 
2007: 5-6). Sen identified the main factors that determine a person's capacity for ‘exchange entitlement’ 
during possible famine: (1) if a person can find a job; (2) what a person can earn by selling his non-
labour assets, and what food is possible to buy for the amount received from sale; (3) if a person is 
capable of producing food or related goods (for which food is exchangeable) with his/her own labour 
power and resources; (4)  the cost of purchasing resources and the value of the products a person can 
sell; (5) the social security benefits a person is legally entitled to and taxes a person must pay (Sen, 1981: 
3). The entitlement approach provides a “general framework for analysing famines” with an emphasis 
on food crisis that occurs on the household levels during positive economic trends on the national and 
regional level. And most importantly, this framework of analysis provides a conceptual difference 
between the “decline of food availability and that of direct entitlement to food.” The direct entitlement 
is focused on the identification of vulnerable households or individuals in the society that maybe at risk 
of starvation due to the combination of depressing market forces and limited/no support by the public 
social security system. Thus, the ‘entitlement approach emphasizes the rights of vulnerable population 
during the time of localized food crisis. Moreover some market forces can only be activated and 
permitted “through a system of legal relations (ownership rights, contractual obligations, legal 
exchanges, etc.).” Hence, the law and governance system mediates between food availability and food 
entitlement (Sen, 1981: 159-162). 
When Sen wrote about the famine “most theorists were preoccupied with explaining failures of food 
supply” and used Malthusian assumptions, which required technical solutions to famine (Devereux, 
2007: 9). Thus, this work of Sen was an academic breakthrough for the new ‘development economics’ 
discourse of famine concept. The criticism of ‘entitlement approach’ to explain famines is limited by the 
assumption that government system and regime is to resolve the food crisis, where market failure and 
consequent ‘negative externalities’ can be internalized through  government intervention and 
laws/regulations. However, the famines that were “triggered by catastrophic government policies or 
failures of the humanitarian relief” and often happen in fragile or failed states are beyond the scope of 
‘entitlement approach’ explanation. The entitlement approach fundamentally emphasises the 
development/welfare economic analysis of famine as a dependent variable of entitlement failure such as 
“lack of purchasing power” or failures of markets (Devereux, 2007: 10). This approach directed the 
studies of famines prevention and resolution towards development economics, which analysed the 
disruption of the food market in terms of the ‘supply failure’ or ‘demand failure’ (Devereux, 2007). It 
has also influenced the mainstream international development initiatives for the improvement of 
transportation, communications infrastructure for rural communities, and peripheral regions, as well as 
government regulations and response mechanism to food crisis. The UN Development Programme 
(UNDP) uses this approach for risk management among vulnerable individuals and households to 
starvation during food crises in developing countries. The UNDP ‘human security’ includes the 
legitimate concerns of ordinary people, such as starvation, disease, and repressions, as well as other 
sudden and damaging disruptions of daily life. This expanded definition includes seven categories of 
disruption of human security: economy, food, health, environment, personal safety, community, and 
politics (UNDP, 1994). The main criticism of this was that the vast scope of categories, including ‘food 
security’ (rather than ‘famine’) may include almost “any kind of unexpected or irregular discomfort 
could conceivably constitute a threat to one’s human security” (Paris, 2001: 89). Despite its limitations, 
‘human security’ institutionalized ‘food security’ as part of its definition. Thus, the multi -dimensional 
aspect of ‘food security’ has been particularly influenced by the theory and practice of development 
studies (Shaw, 2007). 
‘New Famine’ 
The ‘new famine’ concept has come from the school of thought that could also be called ‘critical 
development studies.’ The main criticism of the school was directed towards liberal institutionalist and 
realist explanations of the failure of peace, development, human security, and other initiatives of 
international organizations, non-governmental organizations, and governments. In the post-World War 
II period institutional liberals accepted that the occurrence of market failure results in uneven 
development, poverty, and environmental degradation. In order to prevent the possible crisis and state 
failure mostly in the developing countries there should be “some outside involvement… to supplement 
the market” (Cohn, 2008: 71). This outside involvement is usually in the form of international 
institutions. The ‘institutions’ can correspond to international organizations such as UNDP, the United 
Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), UN Food and Agriculture 
(FAO), and World Bank, international NGOs such as Red Cross and Oxfam, or to international 
regimes often associated with these organizations (Cohn, 2008). On the one hand, liberal 
institutionalist critique had questioned the realist assumption of the centrality of states, national 
interests, military, and economic development rather proposing the international institutional setting 
for cooperation. On the other hand, critical development studies questioned the hidden assumptions 
and benefits of the donor countries policies with their own national interests. Therefore, the ‘new 
famine’ concept has been increasingly focused on the politics of famine prevention and response to 
food crisis by governments and international organizations. The emphases of the studies have been 
particularly on “building accountability through democratization, the development of ‘social contracts’ 
between governments and citizens, and strengthening the ‘right to food’ in international law, including 
the criminalization of famine” (Devereux, 2007: 2). There are two main characteristics that are unique 
about ‘new famine’ thinking: (1) an emphasis on the political analysis “as central to explanations of 
famine causation” and (2) a methodical emphasis on the accountability failures “to prevent famine, 
rather than on the triggers of food shortage or disrupted access to food” (Devereux, 2007: 7). There are 
three contemporary authors - Mark Duffield (Duffield, 2007), David Keen (Keen, 2008), Alex de Waal 
(de Waal, 1997) - who provided the major criticism of the ‘old’ famine’ notions, as well as the 
international response to government failure according to the mainstream liberal institutionalist 
discourse of the humanitarian assistance, development, aid politics, and human security. They are often 
called ‘complex emergencies theorists,’ who developed an alternative way to analyze and explain the 
vulnerability of people to famine. The main propositions of this framework are that all disasters have 
winners and losers, and that famine results from the conscious exercise of power in pursuit of gain or 
advantage (Devereux, 2007). All three ‘complex emergency’ theorists use biopolitics of Foucault to 
explain the limitations of neo-liberal practice of governments, international organizations and NGOs 
particularly during the humanitarian disasters, such as famine. For example, Duffield discusses the 
concept of biopolitics in the context of fragile and failed states (Duffield, 2007). He distinguishes life in 
the developed and undeveloped worlds as ‘insured’ and ‘uninsured,’ which is protected by government 
or ‘exposed by it.’ The nature and implication of this biopolitical relationship between states, territories, 
and populations has been neglected by mainstream academe. He argues that, since the beginning of the 
twentieth century, different groups, communities, and peoples were made to change their economic and 
social systems in order “to support and promote collective life.” This brought a biopolitical hierarchy 
between ‘developed’ and ‘underdeveloped’ species-life that is determined not only by the wealth but by 
the welfare governance mechanisms of support for the ‘survival’ of particular population. 
For Foucault (2008), the biopolitics is about the transformation from the classical age to the modern 
age where ‘modern life’ with its systems is discovered and governed. In the beginning of the seventeenth 
century, there were two major types of powers: (1) an authoritarian ‘sovereign power’ of kings and 
queens that allows and disallows life and (2) a ‘disciplinary power’ that trains ‘human-as-machine’ 
through establishment of institutions for medicine, education, military, and prisons. However from the 
middle of the eighteenth century there is a new type of power that unleashed on human life – (3) 
‘biopower,’ which normatively regulates and improves biological and physiological characteristics of 
‘human bodies’ from birth to death on the collective level of population. The biopower expresses itself 
through institutions of health, sanitation, hygiene, education, and other institutions of population 
surveillance, safety, and overall security allowing, improving and “managing life rather than threatening 
to take it away” (Taylor, 2011: 41-54). The arrival of modernity with its technologies, industries, and 
factory-models had given political powers to ‘civilize,’ ‘discipline,’ and ‘improve’ those human beings left 
‘behind’ in the inefficient traditional lifestyles. Therefore, the biopolitics and its governmentality is 
about the “promotion of the productivity and potentiality of species life” as whole that is “susceptible to 
historical transformations” in particular geographic locations in order to regulate and administer the life 
of population to the necessities of ‘biopolitical economy of security’ (Drillon & Lobo-Guerrero, 2008: 
270-271, 273). Thus, Duffield depicts the ‘complex malfunctioning’ of fragile or failed states that 
expressed in humanitarian disasters. He argues that the ‘life-form’ in developed world, particularly in 
Europe, is different from life of people in underdeveloped world by “the degree to which life is 
supported by a comprehensive mixture of remedial and supportive measures, including public and 
private insurance-based safety nets, that cover birth, education, employment, health, and pensions” 
 (Duffield, 2007: 5-6). The life of people is consistently managed by the state through the provision of 
social welfare system to protect the vulnerable or marginalized population.  Hence, the effective modern 
states are assumed to be progressively expanding the knowledge and ability to support life of 
population. To realize their population’s optimal productive potential, a modern state needs to exercise 
its biopower by preventing infectious and chronic diseases, by recording the movements of people for 
their safety, by educating and disciplining for preventative measures, and by insuring all possible risks 
that cannot be prevented. Keen however shows how ‘famine’ can be used as a mechanism for political, 
military, and economic gain of the government or particular rebel/political groups during protracted 
conflicts, natural calamities, or other humanitarian disasters. He argues it is critical to pay attention to 
the ‘politics of famine’ in order to understand the complexities of famine. He uses the example of 
Ethiopian famine of 1983-1984, where the government of Ethiopia had officially stated that the causes 
of famine were drought, environmental decline, and overpopulation. However the government decision 
for militias and army to block the humanitarian relief for famine to communities that supported rebel 
groups had been a crucial factor for humanitarian disaster (Keen, 2008). Thus, in this case famine was 
used as a political and military measure for counter-insurgency operation. Some modern famines are 
therefore were caused by public governance failures or collapses. The environmental factors such as 
droughts, floods, storms, or political/military factors such as conflicts can be triggers for the food 
shortage. However, it is the failure of appropriate action or conscious inaction of local, national and 
international response to food crisis that allows the food shortage to turn into a ‘famine’ (Devereux, 
2007). Moreover, even though the notion of ‘right to food’ has been part of the international 
declarations there are still limits to how much accountability can be enforced. Thus, the understanding 
of the ‘new famine’ concept provides the recognition of ‘famines as a political notion,’ which often 
influence the marginalized societies within the state. Famine can become biopolitical when the regime, 
regulations, and accountability of the authority fail to prevent or respond to the food crisis rationalizing 
it as biopolitical ‘collateral damage’ necessary for national development of the ‘majority.’ Moreover, the 
biopolitics of famine becomes international when local, sub-national, or national welfare safety nets and 
response mechanisms are not able or not willing to handle the food crisis, which escalates it to the 
involvement of powerful international multilateral institutions and foreign governments. 
 
RESULT AND ANALYSES 
SOVIET FAMINE OF 1931-1933 IN KAZAKHSTAN 
Famine was one of the major concerns that the Soviet system pledged to resolve because food 
shortage had been politicized through the very beginning of the USSR creation (Filtzer, 2010).  Food 
shortage was an issue in the World War I, the February and October Revolutions of 1917, and Civil 
War of 1918-1921. By 1921 the economy of the new country was nearly completely ruined (Peet & 
Hartwick, 2009). To recover the economy, the state initiated industrialization reforms that had to be 
financed by the ‘primitive capital accumulation’ from the agrarian sector of the economy and invested 
in the greater socialist modernization drive. The rural population nonetheless had only partially 
supported the industrial agenda and had a limited understanding of the government initiatives. In 
particular, many herders in Kazakhstan lived nomadic and semi-nomadic lives and were mostly involved 
in ‘qoja-related Sufism’ traditions as well as with the more formalized “mosque-centred Sunni Islam of 
the Hanafi madhhab” practices, which were being introduced by Tatar mullas since 18th century 
(Yemelianova, 2014: 288-289).  The “main bearers of Kazakh Sufi Islam were qojas (Sufi shaykhs) who 
initially belonged to those aq suyek (white bone) who claimed their descent from Muslim saints, from 
the Four Righteous Caliphs, or even from the Prophet Muhammad himself.” The most prominent 
example of Sufism in Southern Kazakhstan was “Qoja Ahmad Yasawi (1093–1166), the founder of the 
Yasawiyya,” a native of the present day Turkistan city in Southern Kazakhstan (Yemelianova, 2014: 
288).  Traditional Islamic rituals and nomadic traditions of herdsmen of the Eurasian steppe became 
part of the ‘Kazakh’ identity for several hundred years and are distinct from the identities of other 
Central Asians and Russians. And “up until the early 1930s, people were not familiar with the Soviet 
ideology” and the government plans for social modernization and industrialization (Nurtazina, 2011: 
105). The prosperous middle-class rural population was formally announced as ‘enemy of the Soviet 
state’ and were designated as derogatory ‘Kulak’ class.  The subsequent famine, however, affected not 
only the Kulak class, but also the large populations in regions of Ukraine, Volga, Ural, Siberia, and in 
Kazakhstan. The forced economic mobilization and rural collectivization policies resulted in the 
disastrous famine of 1931-1933 (Filtzer, 2010: 167-168). Foucault’s discourse on biopolitics (Foucault, 
2008) appears to be appropriate to frame the biopolitical interaction between the central authorities 
and the peripheral regions of Soviet Union. Devereux wrote that the Soviet famines of the 1920s to the 
1940s were “largely attributable to the malevolent or incompetent exercise of state power by 
authoritarian and unaccountable regimes.” The move to ‘collectivized farming’ included the 
appropriation of peasant property, the ban of trade and other private enterprises, as well as the lack of 
responsiveness “to signals of food crisis.” Ukraine had politicized the issue of Soviet famine to redefine 
it as “Stalin’s genocidal policies against the Ukraine in the 1930s, [where] famine conditions were 
deliberately constructed by the state” (Devereux, 2007: 4). However, other regions of the Soviet 
periphery consider this unfortunate period of collectivization, peasant rebellion (Viola, 1996) and 
famine (Ivnitskiy, 2009) as a start of Stalinism as a whole, in which socio-economic system of repression 
(Gregory, 2004) and labour camps (Gregory & Lazarev, 2003) became the norm. 
 
THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF SOVIET FAMINE 
In 1929, the 16th Party Congress made a critical decision “to abandon the New Economic Policy 
(NEP) for a never-before-tried feat of social engineering.” The new initiative was called the Great 
Breakthrough. This social engineering was about the new Soviet political, social, and economic system 
of management that included the “complete state ownership and elimination of private economic 
activities” (Hughes, 1991: 1-2). This change marked a start for the more authoritarian regime, radical 
economic, and social policies and highly controversial disciplining measures of labour camp system that 
is now associated with the notion of Stalinism. In contrast, NEP introduced by Lenin with the support 
of Bukharin was characterized by the mixed economy of private ownership with small and medium 
enterprises, while the state still controlled banks, international trade, and large industries. If the 
agricultural production statistics for the period between 1921 and 1927 are compared to the pre-
revolutionary production of 1916, then there is a considerable improvement in the food production 
(Figures 1, 2). The staple foods in the temperate climate are predominantly wheat for bread production 
and meat. The wheat production drastically fell in 1923 compared to 1916 levels (Figure 1) due to the 
Revolution and Civil War. However, from the start of NEP until 1927 there was a considerable increase 
in the area for wheat sowing and in sheep production (Figures 1, 2). The decision to move to a new 
economic order was the combination of at least three factors that influenced Stalin: (1) Soviet grain 
crisis of 1927-1928, (2) Stalin’s experiences during the trip to Siberia in 1928, and (3) the Capital 
Accumulation doctrine that was developed by Trotsky and later by Preobrazhensky for rapid 
industrialization. The grain crisis of 1927-1928 conforms to what may be called a classic Sen 
‘entitlement approach’ crisis. The food crisis occurred because of the combination of government 
regulation on ceiling price, taxation, and the lack of manufactured goods while oversupply of 
agricultural goods in the market. The emphasis was on the “practice of compulsory extraction of 
agricultural production from the peasants” wherein the government purchases agricultural products 
such as grain from the peasants at artificially low prices (Ertz, 2005: 1-14).  
 
Figure 1. The Area used for wheat and rye production in 1916 in Russia and in 1923-1927 in the 
USSR 
 
Source: State Statistical Publisher (1930) 
 
Figure 2.  Heads of cattle in the farms of the USSR in 1924-1927 (in thousands of heads) 
 
Source: State Statistical Publisher (1930) 
 
On December 1927, the 15th Party Congress introduced the notion of planned economy. The 
endorsement of the first five-year plan required the government to accumulate capital for 
industrialization. In order to lower the level of government spending for centralized grain procurement, 
the purchasing price was lowered. The recollection of hardship conditions similar to this during World 
War I resulted in the widespread war scare in late 1927. The war scare and overall negative expectations 
about the economy caused people to hoard food. To protect the rural communities from further crisis 
“peasants made the choice to eat more and sell less” (Viola, 1996: 21-22). Despite good harvest and 
reliable meat production, the outcome was a disastrous underperformance in the national grain 
procurement. The food crisis was severe in the urbanized industrial centres of the Volga, the Urals, and 
the Western Siberia even though the harvest had been excellent in these areas. This was because 
wealthier peasants withheld grain from the market with the expectations that the prices will rise in the 
next years (Ivnitskiy, 2009). 
 
Figure 3. Average yield for grains (pud/ha) 
 
Source: Ivnitskiy (2009: 68-69) 
 
However the years following 1928 (see Figure 3) would only be worse for the staple food. The food 
crisis of 1927-1928 was only the beginning of the greater domino-effect of the complex political 
emergency. Starting from 1929 there were changes in the agricultural system that affected the lives of 
rural populations more than the events of October Revolution of 1917. The crucial factor for the 
decision to abandon NEP was Stalin’s tour of Siberia in January 1928. Stalin had toured the Siberian 
region in “search of a quick breakthrough in the crisis.” However the overall experience of this trip had 
made a “negative effect on his outlook towards the (Leninist) program of socialism 'at a snail's pace.’” 
The trip proved essential to validate his suspicion that the Kulaks in the periphery were withholding 
food supplies from the market in order to sabotage his regime. The central authorities in Moscow were 
concerned about the political aspect of the 1927 ‘entitlement problem’ of emergent market failure and 
increasing inflation for food. Hence, from the Marxist perspective the class struggle had been 
intensifying into possible political predicament. The livelihood of Siberian rural population was quite 
satisfactory: NEP had brought “the growth of peasant income in real terms.” Hence, there was an 
increased demand for the industrially manufactured goods among peasants “adding to peasant income, 
further depleting goods stocks and causing a price inflation spiral” for manufactured and agricultural 
goods (Hughes, 1991: 98). 
Stalin was not content with the combination of issues in Siberia. The prosperity of capitalist 
entrepreneurship among rural population, the growing real income among agricultural producers and 
inflation was disruptive for the system. Crucially, there was a lack of industrial development associated 
with the workers’ class. To change this complex trend required a radical reform that could only be 
implemented rapidly through enforced conformity to a centralized collective ‘factory-like’ system of 
agriculture. After all, the Revolution and Civil War had been supported by the industrial factory 
workers and weary World War I soldiers, but not by peasants who were the majority in the wide Steppes 
and in Siberia. Hence, Stalin realized that peasants and their life need to be transformed into a new 
system of ‘classless society’ with ‘depeasantization’ of the village (Viola, 1996: 3). Stalin’s tour of Siberia 
had proved that the emergency measures to expropriate the grains and other food from the unruly 
peasantry were of a political necessity to maintain a regime and promote industrialization. As a result, 
there was an agreement for new radicalism and “enthusiastic advocacy of the use of emergency coercive 
measures against peasants” who failed to conform to the policies. This new radicalism of rapid 
industrialization had been named as “the second revolution of late 1929” in the Soviet Union (Hughes, 
1991: 1-2). Historically, pre-industrial England was able to accumulate the large amount of capital 
quickly by colonization and gun-boat diplomacy. Therefore, there was a historic precedent of first 
successful capitalists, who “accumulated capital by stealing from weaker elements of society or as 
wartime booty” (Gregory, 2004: 29). Thus, Soviet farmers’ agricultural surplus had to be appropriated 
for investment into the industry. Preobrazhensky clearly identified the source of ‘primitive capital 
accumulation,’ but he failed to explain the transfer mechanism. His solution was that the state 
monopolized the purchasing of grains with the low ceiling prices to reduce the peasant income. The 
state was then to resell the food at higher prices using the profit to fund industrialization (Gregory, 
2004). The result was the Great Breakthrough policy approved at the 16th Party Congress. The Five-
Year Plan provided the advisory for implementation called ‘On Grain Procurements’ with the 
“principle of compulsory agricultural deliveries” and the “declaration of war against the more 
prosperous peasants, the Kulaks” on January 5, 1930. The policy intention was “liquidating” the Kulak 
as a class. This was the start of colossal industrialization drive of Stalinism through the help of 
collectivization, labour camps, and prisons (Gregory & Lazarev, 2003: 22-23). It was essential not only 
for the survival of economic system and political regime, but also for the emerging modernist Soviet 
citizenship “as the area defining Soviet identity” (Clark, 2011: 9). 
 
FAMINE IN KAZAKHSTAN 
For hundreds of years, the Kazakhs, a people of Turkic origin, maintained a traditional livestock-
based economy, a distinct culture, and agricultural practices suited to nomadic lifestyle on the vast 
pasture lands of Eurasia. The ruthless collectivization program imposed by the Soviet Union on the 
Kazakh people significantly altered their traditional lifestyle. There are many personal accounts for this 
traumatic social transformation; one of the most popular is the autobiography Silent Steppe 
 (Shayakhmetov, 2007). The forced appropriation of livestock and the aggressive ‘cynical campaign’ for 
continuous collection of meat from already impoverished herders in the harsh climatic conditions of 
winter left them with no other options for sustenance (Nurtazina, 2011). The collectivization was 
implemented by the young urban activists who had limited knowledge about Kazakh indigenous 
agricultural practices for livestock production. Collectivization proceeded nonetheless, and resulted in 
slaughter of livestock, suffering, and death among people whose subsistence depended on livestock-
raising (Wilber, 1969). The revised ‘Soviet way of living’ obligated Kazakhs to contribute to the 
development of the ‘New Lands’ under the collective farms systems, namely ‘kolkhoz’ (collective farm) 
and ‘sovkhoz’ (Soviet farm) systems, and promoted the propaganda of the desirable ‘collective farm 
worker.’ The socio-economic systems of the predominantly Islamic nomads were regarded as 
“incompatible with modern materialism and progress" promoted by the Soviet Union (Wheeler, 1957). 
There are no agreed estimates of how many people died in the famine of 1931-1933 in the Soviet 
Union and in Kazakhstan. It is even more difficult to estimate how many people died directly because 
of starvation or associated causes such as diseases and political repressions associated with the 
subversion of Kazakhs to the Soviet policies. 
Zh. Abylkhozhin, M. Kozybaev, and M. Tatimov in their article published on the pages of the All-
Soviet-Union journal Voprosy istorii in 1989, in which the loss of the Kazakh population was 
estimated to be about 2 million people, or 49 percent of the population, and the “direct victims of 
hunger,” in their opinion, comprised 1,750,000 people that made up 42 percent of the Kazakh 
ethnic group. B. Tolepbaev and V. Osipov claimed that the number of Kazakhs who died from 
starvation was between about 1,050,000 and 1,100,000 people; of other ethnic groups of the 
republic, the figure was between 200,000 and 250,000... V. Mikhailov, the author of the 
documentary narrative Chronicle of Great Jut in his interview with Radio Azattyq on December 9, 
2008, gave a figure of 40 percent. The latest estimation made by the Kazakh demographer M. 
Tatimov was that 2,137,500 Kazakhs died of hunger and disease, and that the number of refugees 
from Kazakhstan leaving the country forever was 616,000 people (about 205,000 people left for 
China, Afghanistan, and Iran). Thus, the loss of the indigenous population in Kazakhstan was 
2,635,000 people or 64 percent of the ethnic group (Nurtazina, 2011: 107-108). 
Similarly as in Kazakhstan, there is no agreement of how many people died in the famine in 
Ukraine, Russia, and other parts of the Soviet Union in early 1930s. Kharkova from the Russian 
Academy of Science published a remarkable comparison of evaluation of famine victims by different 
authors in the USSR (see Table 1). The list of authors she included in her research did not agree on the 
number of famine victims. There is also no agreement in the estimates of famine victims in Kazakhstan 
presented by Nurtazina (2011) in the passage above. 
 
Table 1. The evaluation of victims of famine in 1931-1933 in the USSR 
Authors 
Number of 
victims, in 
million people 
Lorimer, F., 1946 4,8 
Urlanis, B. 1974 2,7 
Wheatcroft, S.C., 1981 3-4 
Anderson, B. A. and Silver, B.D. ,1985 2-3 
Konkvest, R, 1986 8 
Maksudov, S., 1982 9,8 ± 3 
Tsaplin, V., 1989 3,8 
Andreev, E. et al., 1993 7,3 
Ivnitskiy, N., 1995 7,5 
Source: Kharkova (2003) 
 
Demographic data in the Soviet Union of 1930s had been politicized and most of the openly 
available information at a time was introduced through the formal speeches of Stalin. The information 
in the speeches was not consistent and most certainly unreliable. It was only in 1959, six years after the 
death of Stalin that the Soviet Union completed a comprehensive national census and established a 
more objective institution for population studies. Vishnevskiy provided an analysis of Stalin’s speeches 
that mentioned demographic data in 1930s. It showed that there was no consistent, complete, and 
scientific basis for the information that was made available on the exact number of people, mortality, 
and birth estimates in the state. Below are the examples of the speeches made by Stalin on population. 
Workers and peasants live here in general not bad, mortality of population decreased in comparison 
to the pre-war period on 26 percent for adults and on 42.5 percent for children, and annual growth of 
population here is more than 3 million souls. 
What we have for the report period: Population growth of Soviet Union from 160.5 million people 
in the end of 1930 to 168 million in the end of 1933. Here everyone talks that material conditions of 
labourers have considerably improved, that living became better, happier. This is, of course, correct. But 
this leads to the fact that the population began to multiply much faster than in old time. There are 
fewer deaths, more fertility, and the net increase is comparatively more (Vishnevskiy, 2003). 
Olcott, who published extensively on politics in Kazakhstan, used the mortality estimates of Jasny for 
1930s, which show that there were over 1.5 million deaths of Kazakh people. However there were no 
specifications about the causes of these deaths: either by natural causes, or by starvation or by other 
causes linked to repressive sanction under the collectivization program  (Olcott, 1981). Olcott also 
estimated that around 80 percent of Kazakh cattle and sheep herds were destroyed in the 
collectivization campaign between 1928 and 1932. She had also provided data on the number of cattle 
and sheep that she collected from at least three different sources from late 19th century to mid 20th 
century with the gaps in information for some years. However, it still provided an overall picture for the 
tragedy of late 1920s and early 1930s for the predominantly nomadic economy that was dependent on 
the livestock for subsistence (Olcott, 1981). The information on the cattle and sheep ownership in 
Kazakhstan with the data gaps as published by Olcott shows that there was a large reduction in livestock 
numbers in 1933 comparatively to 1929 (Figure 4). The livestock production of traditionally nomadic 
population had not increased through all 1930s (Figure 4). 
  
Figure 4. Number of cattle and sheep in Kazakhstan 
 
Source: Olcott (1981) 
 
This trend was most certainly linked to the famine and the restrictions that were implemented by 
the policies of collectivization. People’s Commissariat of Agriculture report in 1935 showed a reduction 
in the number of horses in Kazakh Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR), as well as in Western 
Siberia, Sverdlovskaya oblast (the Urals), Saratovski krai and Stalingradskiy krai (the Volga region). 
People of Kazakh ASSR and the neighbouring regions of the Urals, the Volga, and Western Siberia 
historically (former area of Tatar-Mongol ‘Golden Horde’) placed an enormous emphasis for traditional 
horse breeding. The drastic reduction of horses in the households meant the economic decline and 
crisis in the society.  
The same report states that “the enormous losses of horses in the farms are caused by sharp class 
struggle in the period of the socialist reconstruction of agriculture. The Kulak top of the village 
destroyed not only its own livestock, but also it harmfully encouraged individual peasant farmers by its 
counterrevolutionary agitation for destruction” (People’s Commissariat of Agriculture of the USSR, 
1935). However it is doubtful that local people who traditionally valued horses as a symbol of prosperity 
would consciously destroy them and encourage other peasants to do the same. Most probably, the 
reduction was caused by famine. The reason for this ‘counterrevolutionary agitation,’ ‘sabotage’ and the 
destruction of traditionally valued horses was not only famine, but also the collectivization campaign.  
For peasants in Kazakhstan the policy of collectivization included the introduction of four different 
types of collective farms: (1) Communes was an entirely communal collective farm with all land, 
animals, and capital owned by the farm commune, which did not allow any individual private 
ownership. (2) Artel was the system when the principle land, animals, and capital were under the 
control of the collective farm, but the families and households were allowed to have a small private plot 
and a few animals for personal use. (3) TOZ or Partnership for the public land work was a society for 
the collective land cultivation, but private ownership of livestock by households was permitted (Male, 
1971). (4) State farm or Soviet farm or Sovkhoz, was of “limited importance in the collectivization drive 
in Kazakhstan and in spring 1930 there were only sixty-two sovkhoz in the whole of the republic, and 
most were in Russian populated regions” (Olcott, 1981: 122). Those farmers who resisted these 
categories of collective farms were considered ‘enemies of State.’ Furthermore, the farmers who had to 
surrender their agricultural produce to the State could only exchange it for the manufactured consumer 
goods that were not vital during the time of famine.  
According to the telegram of Goloshchekin, a Secretary of the Regional Committee of the 
Communist Party of Kazakhstan to Stalin in October 1932, “…the regional commodity fund for the 
grain appropriation comprised mainly of the unmarketable goods. Predominantly, there are the summer 
raincoats, children’s shoes, varnished lady’s shoes, men’s shirts, silk ties.” Moreover, in the 
Akkermirskiy and Nurinskiy regions of Kazakhstan there were “8 boxes of plates, 4 boxes of ash trays, 
cotton balls, face powder” and other consumer goods that were available by state provision for farmers 
in exchange for meat and grains in the time of starvation. The telegram explains that these goods were 
coming from Moscow in exchange for the grain and meat procurements for the Soviet capital. However 
Goloshchekin complained that “goods lie in the storages” but farmers who surrendered the grain and 
meat rejected these consumer goods (Ministry of Internal Affairs, 2012: 205).  
The other telegram to Stalin showed the difficulties with the collectivization reforms in the Southern 
Kazakhstan and required the permission for the use of repressive measures to settled population with 
exceptions for the nomadic or semi-nomadic people. There was a disagreement in the regional 
committees about “methods and repressive measures” used for nomadic population that was “analogous 
to the accepted [repressive measures] on the directives in the Kuban regions.” By November 1932 “there 
were 19 whole regions and some collective farms in 16 other regions” of Kazakhstan, which were 
included into the disciplinary ‘black board’ (Famine in the USSR 1929-1934, Ministry of Internal 
Affairs 2012: 218-219, 1932).” The disciplinary measures included death penalties, arrests, forced 
labour, and fines. Stalin replied the next day with another coded telegram, where he considered that the 
evaluation of Comrade Kakhiani on punishing only settled rural population was “completely incorrect 
with the given conditions.” Apparently, Comrade Kakhiani did not consider that in the recent weeks of 
grain supply in Kazakhstan “there was irregularly, and this despite the fact that the plan of grain supply 
is maximally reduced, but debt according to the plan of the procurement is 10 million puds.” With 
such conditions there was a need for punishing all the Communists in the regions, “who are in the 
captivity of petty-bourgeois elements and Kulaks who sabotage grain provisions.” Therefore repressive 
measures were permitted for the nomadic and semi-nomadic population. Stalin also added that “of 
course, the matter cannot be limited by repressions, since it is also necessary in parallel to provide the 
widespread and systematic explanatory work.” In other words, there was also the need for the 
appropriate publicity of the collectivization policy so that rural population would be educated into the 
Soviet ideology and system (Famine in the USSR 1929-1934, Ministry of Internal Affairs 2012: 220-221, 
1932).  
The instructions of Stalin demonstrate that famine was not merely an incidental consequence of 
repressive policies. Mass starvation and hardship were calculated effects that, technically, were aids to 
socio-economic redistribution and reconstruction in areas where moderate policies would not have 
brought the desired effects within short time. In this case, there were no natural disruptions in the 
biosphere or purely market forces disruptions, which would have allowed the use of Malthusian 
physical/natural or Sen’s economic constraints as the key factors for explaining famine. The case of 
Kazakhstan’s famine in the 1930s are most viably explained by the complex political factors attributed 
to the willingness of Stalin and the Soviet government to risk the construction of a massive and wholly 
unprecedented socio-economic system, regardless of the cruelty and suffering it entailed on the 
peripheral population. The biopolitics involved the transformation of the village to a new modernized 
system of collective agriculture. Those people who rejected the system were punished by death, labour 
camps, fines, and other repressive measures that included famine.  
 
CONCLUSION 
Thus, there is a clear distinction between (1) the Malthusian famine related to natural or physical 
factors (such as population growth, environmental disturbances, lack of natural resources), (2) 
‘entitlement’ famine related to socio-economic and distributive factors (such as market failure, 
economic, social, or infrastructural obstacles in food supply), and (3) famine related to complex political 
factors. The case analysis of the Soviet famine in 1931-1933 demonstrated that the cause of famine was 
largely political even though there were natural (harsh winter conditions in Kazakhstan) and economic 
factors (underdeveloped infrastructure and government regulation of retail prices) that further 
aggravated the food crisis. The food insecurity was mainly attributed to the incompetent exercise of 
biopower by the state with the mission to rapidly industrialize the Soviet economy and society. Also, the 
regime of Stalin exercised the sovereign power to ‘disallow life’ and disciplinary power towards peasants 
who failed to follow the prescribed policies of collectivization. And most importantly, there was an 
apparent lack of responsiveness and accountability to resolve the consequent food crisis that resulted in 
famine. Moreover, the telegram communication between Stalin and the supervisors of collectivization 
in Kazakhstan had shown that there was an approval to use disciplinary repressive measures to those 
peasants who did not pursue or resisted the collectivization instructions. Thus, famine and associated 
hardship were deliberate political actions. These actions were necessary in order to appropriate 
peasants’ agricultural production by local authorities to generate and accumulate the financial capital 
for industrialization drive on the national level. Because there were no obvious catastrophic natural 
disturbances in the biosphere or devastating market forces disruptions at a time in Kazakhstan, it has 
not been viable to analyse the famine of 1931-1933 using Malthusian physical or Sen’s economic 
constraints as the key explanatory factors. The case of Soviet famine in the 1930s in Kazakhstan is most 
clearly explained by the complex biopolitical factors of industrialization and collectivization policies. It 
was exceptional that the Soviet government and leaders on national, sub-national, and local levels were 
eager to continue with the industrialization program to build a new socio-economic system in a short 
period despite the immense suffering that gripped the peripheral rural population.   
Hence, collectivization reforms entailed the visible exercise of biopower and disciplinary power by 
the central and local authorities of the Soviet Union. The biopolitical dynamics involved the conversion 
of mostly illiterate peasants and their traditional livelihood to a new modernized system of collective 
agriculture. The collectivized agricultural system was intended to eventually improve the standards of 
living as well as economic system for the Soviet ‘agricultural workers.’ However, those farmers who 
disobeyed the new system were punished by death or disciplined by labour camps, expropriation of all 
property, large fines, and other repressive measures. Thus, the political controversy included the positive 
improvement in urban living conditions and technological development of industrialization on one 
hand, and the horrendous deterioration of agrarian production and suffering of peasants in the 
periphery regions on the other hand. There was a convergence of an inherent biopower of the reforms 
introduced for the population with the disciplinary power used for those peasants who resisted the new 
system. Furthermore, the government continued the modernization notwithstanding the issues of 
public accountability, impoverishment of rural population, and deliberate development in ‘key regions’ 
at the expense of the ‘other regions.’ Therefore, the Soviet famine of 1931-1933 can be considered as a 
complex biopolitical issue of the well-informed leaders, who nonetheless neglected the ‘minority’ in the 
periphery in order to build a new and unprecedented modern system according to the agreed 
government priorities and plans. This new system would support the welfare of the ‘majority’ 
population, sustain the country during World War II, and provide an ideational or normative power in 
the Soviet foreign relations with the rest of ‘struggling proletariat,’ at the cost of the nearly -forgotten 
suffering of the Kazakhs just decades before.  
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